The survey of new energy vehicles cheating and replenishment, which began in January this year, officially released the survey results a few days ago. Everyone said that this is a "watershed" in the new energy vehicle market.

On September 8, the Ministry of Finance issued a circular saying that 90 major new energy vehicle enterprises had been specially inspected, involving 401000 new energy vehicles that had obtained and applied for central financial subsidy funds from 2013 to 2015. It also lists five enterprises as typical fraud cases: Suzhou Jim West, Suzhou Jinlong, Shenzhen Wuzhoulong, Chery Wanda Guizhou bus and Henan Shaolin bus, involving a subsidy of 1.01 billion yuan for new energy vehicles. The Ministry of industry and information technology stopped the implementation of central financial subsidies for these five enterprises, cancelled the vehicle qualification of Jim West, and required the other four to remove the problem vehicles from the promotion catalogue and recover the subsidy funds.

Subsequently, a list of so-called "full version" car companies began to circulate on the Internet. According to this list, 70 of the more than 90 enterprises investigated had fraud and illegal compensation, involving a subsidy of 9.2 billion. The official did not respond to this.

Generally speaking, deception and compensation of new energy vehicles can be divided into "vehicles without license", "vehicles without electricity" and "inconsistent identification". In addition to fraudulent compensation, there is also a case of illegal compensation, that is, selling new energy vehicles to affiliated enterprises rather than users, or being idle after being sold to end users.

Wan Gang, Minister of science and technology, revealed in a public speech that China had produced 497000 new energy vehicles from 2009 to 2015, accounting for more than 30% of the global sales of new energy vehicles. Among them, the output in 2015 exceeded 370000. In the same year, the sales volume of new energy vehicles in the United States was 1230400, with a cumulative sales of about 400000. China has become the sales champion in the new energy vehicle market.

However, a circular proves that the rumors of new energy vehicles cheating in the industry are true, and the statement of the Ministry of finance that "the rest of the list will not be published" may also indicate that the five published auto enterprises may only be the "tip of the iceberg" of the cheating team. This makes the cheers of "sales champion" at the beginning of the year seem a little embarrassing.

Wrong subsidy "targeting"

At present, most of the reflections on the fraud of new energy vehicles focus on how to fill the loopholes in the subsidy identification and distribution procedures. Most people in the industry are not willing to completely deny the industry subsidies.

It is not uncommon for countries to subsidize specific industries to promote the development of emerging industries and optimize their own industrial structure. For the new energy vehicle industry alone, the support means of various countries have also been renovated, but generally, the tax reduction policy is the main policy.

For example, the subsidy policies for new energy vehicles in the United States and Japan are mainly carried out through tax cuts and infrastructure subsidies, including charging facility subsidies. However, it is rare for China to directly and extensively carry out huge "consumption subsidies". It can be seen from the previous data that in the subsidy policies from 2013 to 2015, the subsidy for pure electric passengers is divided into three grades: 300000 yuan for 6-8m, 400000 yuan for 8-10m and 500000 yuan for more than 10m. The local subsidy is matched with the national ratio of 1:1. In 2015, for a 6-8m pure electric bus, the national subsidy plus the local subsidy can get about 600000 yuan.

This subsidy method leads to the direct precipitation of the subsidy amount to the sales end. The consequence of the wrong subsidy "targeting" is that the enterprise shortens the R & D process and only wants the products to enter the market quickly. In order to get subsidies, enterprises with immature product technology will blindly push their products to the market, or even try every means to fake sales, or idle their products after selling them to affiliated enterprises, resulting in deception and illegal compensation.

Side effects of industry subsidies

It seems that where there are subsidies, there is a phenomenon of cheating on subsidies. It is a commonplace to cheat and compensate traditional industries such as agriculture and photovoltaic. Take domestic animation as an example. In the context of the national appeal to promote the animation industry, in order to strive for the implementation of relevant projects, local governments will not only give tax incentives, but also subsidize domestic animation according to the number of minutes. Stimulated by subsidies, a large number of shoddy animation works that only want to be released but not for the box office have been listed one after another, pushing the audience into the arms of imported animation.

The demand created by subsidies is "pseudo demand" after all. In terms of the current new energy vehicle market, whether it is the "illusion" of market prosperity brought by subsidies or the policy oriented demand brought by the purchase restriction of ordinary vehicles, it is a distortion of the market mechanism and will lead to the misjudgment of enterprises on the market situation.

However, the industry dependence formed by "consumption subsidy" may be far more serious than misjudging the market. Policy subsidies can not exist forever. Once the profits of enterprises do not rely on consumers who "vote with their feet", but on government subsidies, they will not spend too much effort on competing for the market, let alone R & D and innovation. The rapidly expanding production chain simply due to reckless or extensive policies may collapse once subsidies are reduced or abruptly withdrawn.

Let the policy belong to the policy and the market belong to the market. The formulation of industrial policy should be relatively cautious and fully consider the market law, so as not to disturb the normal development of the industry. The moment when the new energy vehicle market really begins to prosper, it is impossible to come early because of financial subsidies or vehicle purchase restriction policies, and even the enhancement of people's awareness of environmental protection. It can only be that in the cruel struggle of the market, enterprises find their own business model and naturally come after solving the rigid needs of ordinary consumers for price, safety and endurance.

This node cannot arrive in advance because of subsidy support, but it may be "encouraged" and overdrawn productivity in advance because of the wrong way of subsidy.

Extended reading:

Blue Book of new energy vehicles: analysis of "deception and compensation" of new energy vehicles

Original title: market of new energy vehicles cheating and compensating extensive subsidies and misjudgment